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Sustainable Development
and Governance
Yvonne Rydin
INTRODUCTION
The term ‘sustainable development’ is part of
the common currency of public policy nowadays.
International organizations, those at the level of
the nation-state and the locality, within the private
and public sectors all claim sustainable develop-
ment as an objective. The adjective ‘sustainable’
hasbecomesowidelyusedinpolicyandmarketing
literatureastobecomealmostmeaningless.Indeed
some consider that the parent term ‘sustainable
development’has lost any sense of coherent mean-
ing through the multiple demands made of it. It is
criticizedfortheinherentambiguitythatallowsfor
so many different situations and possible futures to
be described as contributing to ‘sustainable devel-
opment’. It is tempting to relegate the term to a
conceptual rubbish bin as having no integrity or
useful conceptual ‘bite’, rather in the way that the
‘public interest’has been disposed of. However, to
do so would be to dismiss the efforts that histori-
cally and currently lie behind the development and
use of the concept to achieve advances in terms of
social justice and environmental protection.
In this chapter, the history of the concept of
sustainable development is brieﬂy outlined, before
discussing key dimensions of the concept itself,
and drawing out the implications of different def-
initions. Then the relationship of the sustainable
development agenda to contemporary patterns of
governance is explored, deﬁning more precisely
what ‘governance’ means and explaining its par-
ticular signiﬁcance to the sustainable development
agenda.Finally,thewaythatgovernanceprocesses
can actually contribute to achieving sustainable
developmentisexamined,withparticularreference
to the local and community level.
THE RISE OF THE SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA
Most histories of the concept attribute its earli-
est uses to the International Union for the Con-
servation of Nature (IUCN, 1980). However, its
contemporary relevance can be traced back to the
United Nations’ World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development, set up in 1984 and chaired
by Gro Harlem Brundtland, then Prime Minister
of Norway and since head of the World Health
Organization.ThisCommissionhaditsrootsintwo
different strands of United Nations (UN) activity.
On the one hand, it was conceived of as the suc-
cessortothecommissionchairedbyWillieBrandt,
ex-Chancellor of West Germany, which resulted in
the North–South report (ICIDI, 1980) calling for
a renegotiation of the relationship between more
and less developed countries. Hence the emphasis
on development within its terms of reference was
a signal that global patterns of economic inequal-
ity were to be a key focus. In the context of the
1980s – before the end of the Cold War and the
physical collapse of the BerlinWall – relationships
between nation-states were also framed in terms
of conﬂict and, in particular, the threat of nuclear
conﬂict.
Ontheotherhand,theCommissionwasalsotak-
ingforwardtheUN’sworkonenvironmentalissues
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UN had seen environmental issues largely in terms
of how the physical environment affected human
needs through the adequacy of housing, water pro-
vision and food security. Key issues were loss of
soil fertility and water management. These were
highlighted at the UN Habitat Conference held in
1972 in Stockholm. By the 1980s the environmen-
tal agenda had broadened out from this local and
strictly anthropocentric focus. The background to
thiswastheemergenceofascientiﬁcconsensuson
key aspects of global environmental change. This
threw the emphasis on how global environmen-
tal systems operated and how individual, spatially
ﬁxed activities could – in aggregate – signiﬁcantly
alter these global systems, in turn impacting on
people across the world.
Although not discussed in any depth by the
Brundtland Commission, the precursor to this new
global emphasis in environmental debates was the
‘discovery’ofthe‘ozonehole’(actuallyaselective
thinning of the stratospheric ozone layer) and its
linking to anthropocentric emissions principally in
theformofchloroﬂuorocarbons(CFCs).Thepolit-
ical impact of the scientiﬁc evidence was consider-
ably enhanced by the ability to graphically repre-
sent the ‘hole’through the use of colour-enhanced
satellite imaging and by the links to health effects,
intermsofmalignantmelanomas(i.e.skincancers)
fromexposuretosunlightforlight-skinnedpeoples
in geographical zones beneath the thinning ozone
layer. Colour pictures and a cancer scare made
for considerable media coverage. The problem of
anthropogenicozonethinningwastackledbyinter-
national agreement for collective action through
the Montreal Protocol adopted in 1987, assisted
by the possibility of a technological substitute for
CFCsandthewillingnessofthekeyeconomicactor
DuPont, as producer of the substitute chemicals, to
support the agreement (Rowlands, 1995).
However, the whole ‘ozone hole’ episode
was important in establishing the possibility
of global environmental change through anthro-
pogenic causes and the need for collective action
at the global scale to tackle such change. In this
context,scientiﬁccommunitiesbegantomakenew
claimsforevidenceofglobalclimatechange.Again
there were anthropogenic sources, in this case the
so-called ‘greenhouse gases’, mainly carbon diox-
ide and methane. The principal blame for such
emissions was laid at the door of the fossil fuel
economy, since the burning of coal and oil was the
key source of carbon dioxide. NGOs, the media
and some policy-makers began to talk of and write
about the ‘greenhouse effect’as a way of popular-
izing the more complex scientiﬁc processes lying
behindthethickeningoflayersofgasesintheupper
atmospherethatwerereﬂectingsolarradiationback
to the Earth’s surface.
There was considerable dispute over these sci-
entiﬁc claims, dispute that continues to this day.
An Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change
wasconvenedin1988bytheWorldMeteorological
OrganizationandtheUNEnvironmentProgramme
to bring together the key scientists involved in
research on this issue. It has produced a series of
reports setting out the evidence for climate change
and seeking to specify future scenarios with ever
greater precision. Over time the IPCC has gener-
ated an ‘almost-consensus’ on the likely extent of
climate change processes. However, it is in the
nature of such forecasting exercises that precise
ﬁgures cannot be given; rather ranges are offered
as descriptions of the future. The current estimates
of global averaged surface temperature increases
lie within ranges of 1.4–5.8 degrees Celsius over
1990–2100. Such prediction of future ranges for
climate change contrasts with the graphic pictures
of ozone thinning that had already happened. The
ranges themselves were also the subject of vigor-
ousdebatewithinthebroaderscientiﬁccommunity
and, even as the scientiﬁc consensus has tightened,
so a band of contrarian scientists has continued to
present an alternative view of the future (McCright
and Dunlap, 2003).
These debates on climate change set the context
for the renaissance of the sustainable develop-
ment concept. They suggested that human action
was generating (and indeed had already generated)
change in global environmental systems, which
was going to have profound impacts on people
across the globe. Among these impacts could be
counted sea-level rise (estimated as a global mean
sea-level rise of 0.09–0.88 metres over 1990–2100
but potentially rising as much as 6 metres if the
Antarctic ice shelf fails), changed patterns of agri-
culture including the results of extended desertiﬁ-
cation, higher incidence of extreme weather events
such as storms and heatwaves, changes in water
availability, loss of habitats and species, and new
public health risks.
Aroundclimatechange,anumberofotherissues
with a global perspective were clustered in the
1980s and 1990s. The ecological consequences of
deforestation, particularly of the tropical rainforest
areas,invariouspartsoftheworldwerehighlighted
byanothersetofscientiﬁcclaims.Biodiversitywas
as frequently identiﬁed as a global environmental
concernasclimatechange,andtheanthropocentric
implications of such biodiversity loss were high-
lighted in terms of potential medical treatments
that awaited discovery within the gene pool. How-
ever, there were also broader concerns about the
existence value of the rainforests and their intrin-
sic value, even their intrinsic right to exist. And
linking these two global issues was the question
of how to reduce the scale of deforestation. Log-
gingwasaparticularcauseofthereductioninscale
and diversity of the rainforests and deforestation
directly contributed to climate change by remov-
ing a carbon sink. In addition, loss of tree cover[18:14 2/7/2007 4952-Cox-Ch35.tex] Paper Size: a4 paper Job No: 4952 Cox: Handbook of Political Geography Page: 3 1–16
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more generally was related to loss of soil fertility
and increased vulnerability of agricultural land to
erosion, with implications for food security.
This mix of global environmental concerns pro-
vided a distinctive context for the deliberations of
the Brundtland Commission. They gathered evi-
dence from a wide variety of sources, including
both accredited experts and local communities
acrosstheworld,inaninnovativemixofsitevisits,
deliberativemeetingsandpublichearings(WCED,
1987:359).Itdevelopedananalysisthatframedthe
problem in terms of global inequalities in develop-
ment, global environmental threats and potentially
catastrophicglobalconﬂicts.Thiswaspresentedin
the Brundtland Report, Our Common Future, pub-
lished in 1987. The report saw the solution to this
problem as the pursuit of ‘a new era of growth’,
but a very different kind of growth.This is the core
of the deﬁnition of sustainable development – a
formofgrowththatcanreduceinequalities,reduce
environmental threats and diffuse conﬂicts, all on
a global scale.
The decades since the publication of the Brundt-
landReporthaveseenthesustainabledevelopment
concept become embedded in policy statements at
local, regional, national and international levels,
althoughthepublicproﬁleoftheagendahaswaxed
and waned. After the publication of the report, an
international summit on environment and develop-
ment was convened in Rio in 1992. Two conven-
tions (on biodiversity and climate change) were
tabled alongside Agenda 21, a manifesto of the
actionsneededtoachievesustainabledevelopment.
Afterwards the UN established a Commission on
Sustainable Development to encourage national
governments to draw up their own Agenda 21 and
monitortheirprogress.Painfullyslowprogresswas
made in translating the Framework Convention
on Climate Change into the Kyoto Protocol and
agreeing to its implementation. It ﬁnally came into
forceinFebruary2005butwithouttheinvolvement
of the USA, currently the world’s largest carbon
dioxide emitter.
In 2002 the UN convened a new summit, the
World Summit on Sustainable Development in
Johannesburg. This was intended to assess the
progress that had been achieved in the twenty
years since Rio. Little of real signiﬁcance could
be reported on any of the major themes of the
Rio Summit: biodiversity loss, deforestation or
climate change. However, the sustainable develop-
ment agenda itself was moving on. In the inter-
vening years, the UN Millennium Development
Goalshadthrowntheemphasisontoissuesofworld
poverty,childmortality,genderequality,education,
food security and public health, although ‘ensur-
ing environmental sustainability’was listed as one
of the eight goals. So the focus during the WSSD
was less purely environmental than had been the
case at the Rio Summit. In more recent years, the
coming into force of the Kyoto Protocol, together
with continuing and increasingly dramatic scien-
tiﬁc evidence of the more imminent impact of
climate change, have somewhat redressed the bal-
ance. The meeting of the G-8 (the political leaders
of the world’s eight largest economies) in 2005
saw global poverty and climate change sharing the
media headlines and policy agenda.
Sustainable development is therefore a core
focus of policy debates, albeit a focus that is vari-
ablydeﬁned.Sohowcantheconceptofsustainable
development be characterized if it is apparently so
ﬂexible? The next section explores this question.
THE CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
The deﬁnition of sustainable development that
is most commonly cited is one taken from the
BruntlandReport(WCED,1987:8):‘toensurethat
[humanity] meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs’.
This is a deﬁnition that is rooted in consider-
ations of equity. The emphasis is on generations,
viewed collectively, as being able to meet their
needs,nottheirdemandsortheirwants.Inthecon-
text of global inequality this is a clear statement
about priorities. Then there is also the empha-
sis on inter-generational equity. The concern here
is that the forms of global environmental change
discussed above are at least partly caused by cur-
rent human activity, but that the major negative
impacts of those changes will be borne by future
generations, and to such an extent that their abil-
ity to meet their basic needs will be adversely
affected.
Inthisformulation,currentgenerationsareeffec-
tively stealing from their collective children and
grandchildren on a global scale. Current economic
growth is achievable only because the negative
inter-temporalexternalitiesofthatgrowtharebeing
ignored.And that economic growth is underpinned
by prevailing patterns of production and consump-
tion so that the current generation’s experience
of these activities is intrinsically unsustainable.
Examplesofthisincludetherelianceonfossilfuels
for energy needs and as a raw material for produc-
tion, the scale and growth of consumption levels
and the rapid turnover in goods generating ever
more waste, as well as demand for further produc-
tion. While the underlying message of the concept
isclear,thesubtletiesofthisformulationcancreate
problems for policy development and implementa-
tion.As a result there has been a search for simpler
ways of deﬁning sustainable development that still
capture the combination of social, environmental
and economic concerns wrapped up in the term.[18:14 2/7/2007 4952-Cox-Ch35.tex] Paper Size: a4 paper Job No: 4952 Cox: Handbook of Political Geography Page: 4 1–16
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One common way to do this is to identify these
differentaspectsas‘pillars’ofsustainabledevelop-
mentandthenconceptualizetheirinterrelationship.
Forexample,theycanbeconceptualizedasdistinct
but overlapping areas (see Figure 35.1). Potential
development paths or policy approaches can then
be mapped onto this Venn diagram model (Levett,
1998).
Theideahereisthatfuturepossibilitiesshouldbe
judged against their contribution to each of the ele-
ments of sustainable development. Development
that meets only economic criteria of viability and
proﬁtability would fall within the economic circle
but outside any area of overlap. If there were also
social beneﬁts accruing from this development,
then it would fall into the area of overlap between
the economic and the social. If on the other hand
there were environmental beneﬁts, it would be the
overlap between the economic and environmental
areas that was relevant.
The goal of sustainable development is, there-
fore, to ﬁnd development opportunities and future
paths that fall within the centre of the Venn dia-
gram where all three areas overlap. However, this
would involve ﬁnding win-win-win development
paths that offer beneﬁts on all three fronts. In
practice, this can be difﬁcult and the emphasis is
instead on identifying win-win options, focusing
on two of the three pillars. For example, there
is an approach that sees considerable potential
for expanding the area of overlap between eco-
nomic and environmental goals in Figure 35.1.
This sees the hope of steering economic activ-
ity in more environmentally friendly paths. It
looks at the historic trajectory of many developed
countries, passing from a predominantly rural
economy through a dirty phase of industrialization
and then into a cleaner period of late industrial-
ization and into a predominantly tertiary economy.
From this trajectory the possibility of environmen-
talimpactsactuallyreducingwithincreasedgrowth
is seen as a historic reality and therefore a feasible
future.
Under the banner of ecological modernization,
these theorists see the potential of establishing a
series of institutional incentives that would hasten
movement towards a growth-oriented but environ-
mental friendly society (Gouldson and Murphy,
1998). Such incentives would include a mix of
ﬁscal arrangements, both taxes and subsidies,
together with regulation. The aim would be a form
of economic activity that was much more efﬁcient
in its resource use, increasing the output/resources
ratio by a factor of 4 or even 10 (Weizsäcker
et al., 1998). Waste would also be minimized as a
corollary of this approach, reducing pollution and
waste disposal problems. By including energy as
a key resource, this approach would also tackle
the spectre of global warming through reducing
dependence on energy sources and simultaneously
shiftingfromfossilfuelstorenewablesources.The
mixture of judicious governmental policy, tech-
nological innovations and continued reliance on
market signals would realize sustainable develop-
mentasamixofeconomicandenvironmentalgoals
within a predominantly unchanged economic sys-
tem. However, the reliance on market signals to
generate economic activity would not necessarily
mean that social goals were satisﬁed; indeed, past
experience suggests that such pursuit of economic
Economic
Social
Environmental
Sustainable
Development
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growth may exacerbate social inequalities, at least
intheshortterm.Inasimilarway,alternativepaths
can be identiﬁed that emphasize the possibility
of ﬁnding synergies between environmental and
socialgoalsoreconomicandsocialgoalsunderthe
banner of environmental justice (Agyeman et al.,
2001) or corporate social responsibility (Zadek,
2001) respectively.
While the Venn diagram model suggests in its
pictorial representation that all three elements are
on a par, it is implicit in this model that economic
processes are the appropriate starting point. For
economic processes are seen as the route through
which needs as well as demands are met, and
are therefore inevitably at the core of sustainable
development. This was a key assumption of the
Brundtland Report, which called for a new era
of growth as the way to tackle global poverty.
While this growth is recast as development and
not as a simple extension of conventional growth
paths, this is still a future based on a variation
of market-led or capitalist economic activity. This
raises the question of how far current patterns
of economic activity can be shaped to ﬁt within
a sustainable future (Jacobs, 1991). Some envi-
ronmentalists have queried whether this provides
a sufﬁcient level of environmental protection or
whetherthepaceofchangemightnotbetooslowto
avoid ecological catastrophe. Instead they empha-
sizethecriticalnatureoftheenvironmentalsystems
on which all other activities, including economic
activity, must rely.
This is related to the distinction within sus-
tainable development debates between weak and
strong sustainability (Neumayer, 2003). In weak
sustainability, the environment is seen as having
valued dimensions for both its life-support func-
tions and its abilities in providing food, other
resources and the capacity of a pollution sink, but
there are unlimited possibilities for compensating
forenvironmentalcostsorlossesthrougheconomic
growth. Investment in other forms of physical
and indeed human capital can be used to trade
offenvironmentaldegradation.Thus,development
in a rare ecological habitat can be compensated
through creating other habitats or nature conserva-
tion features elsewhere. The use of environmental
valuation techniques is often invoked as a way
of enabling such trade-offs and compensation to
be calculated and put into effect (Pearce et al.,
1989).
However, critics of the weak sustainability posi-
tion argue that some aspects of the environment
cannot be substituted for or traded off in this
way. Exactly which aspects fall into this cate-
gory is debatable, but they may include climate
control functions, pollution sinks with a limited
capacity, valued landscapes, rare habitats, and
areas of signiﬁcant cultural heritage including his-
toric buildings. These could all be termed critical
natural capital (man-made capital in the case of
historic buildings) and as such fall into a differ-
ent conceptual category to other aspects of the
environment that are not seen as so unique and
important (Owens, 1994). The difﬁculty here is
that the categorization of critical natural capital
is inherently subjective, even where informed by
scientiﬁc expertise that has widespread legitimacy.
Asitemaybecategorizedasanecologicallyimpor-
tant habitat, but this may differ from the value
that society collectively places on such a habitat.
Where landscape is concerned, many a NIMBY
(Not In My Back Yard) campaign has been based
around arguments of the uniqueness of an area
and its views; this is not so much a question
of whether the landscape should be classiﬁed as
critical natural capital or not but rather whose
view of what counts as critical natural capital is
prioritized.
For some this problem arises because a range
of cultural artefacts is being considered under
the heading of critical natural capital when this
term should properly be kept for the functioning
of global environmental systems. The emphasis
should thus be on global warming as a result of
the overuse of global carbon sinks, losses in global
(rather than local) biodiversity, and the inevitabil-
ity of entropy reducing the ability to continually
reprocess and recycle physical products through
the application of energy sources.Afocus on these
aspects suggests a strong sustainability position
in which not only are such environmental assets
and services treated as non-substitutable, but a
strong case is made for actual limits to economic
growth. The promise of ecological modernization
is seen as a false promise and instead measures
are proposed to enable society to move towards
a situation where it can live within the limits
of ‘Spaceship Earth’. Such measures can include
Daly’s(1992)draconianbirthpermitsandresource
quotas.
Such a strong sustainability perspective favours
a Russian doll, as opposed to a Venn diagram,
model of the concept (see Figure 35.2; see also
Levett, 1998). Here the environmental concerns
are seen as at the core of the concept, surrounded
by social concerns, and only then economic con-
cerns. The implication is that economic activity
depends on social structures and, fundamentally,
onenvironmentalsystems.Ensuringthateconomic
development is sustainable means taking account
of these environmental limits and the social con-
straints on routine economic decision-making and
leadstodemandsformoreradicalchangesinsocial
organization and economic practices. This then
raises the question of how contemporary routines
of politics and policy can respond to such a rad-
ical agenda and, more broadly, the relationship
between governance processes and sustainable
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Economic Social Environmental
Figure 35.2 The Russian doll model of sustainable development.
GOVERNANCE AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT
The pursuit of good governance is sometimes
referred to as the fourth pillar of sustainable devel-
opment, suggesting that sustainable development
is also about new ways of doing policy as much as
new outcomes. Why should governance be seen as
so integral to sustainable development? To under-
stand this, it is necessary to understand the concept
of governance too (Rhodes, 1995).
Governance can be understood as a descriptive
account of trends in contemporary society affect-
ing the state and the public sector (although there
isaparalleltrendconcerningthecorporatesector–
see below). At the core of this trend is a different
relationship to stakeholders; indeed it implies the
identiﬁcationofabroaderrangeofactorsashaving
a‘stake’inapolicyissue.Overthelasttwodecades
there has been a shift within many countries and
across many international organizations towards
relying on stakeholder involvement not just for
consultation during the formulation of policy,
but in terms of a more meaningful involvement,
participating in decision-making and even taking
responsibility for the delivery of policy outcomes.
This shift arose from the recognition during the
late 1970s and 1980s that governments and their
agents often did not have the ‘capacity to act’, to
implement effectively and deliver on their policy
intentions. Many of the key resources – ﬁnancial
but also informational and capacity building –
depended on the involvement of non-state actors.
Involvement throughout the policy process could
alsoavoidconﬂictatalaterstageholdinguppolicy
delivery and could provide greater legitimacy for
policy outcomes. For all these reasons, stake-
holder involvement under conditions of gover-
nance became increasingly prevalent during the
late twentieth and early twenty-ﬁrst centuries.
Analytically this has thrown the emphasis on
understanding how complex sets of networks
interrelate within policy contexts. Such networks
describe the interconnections between actors,
allowing governance to be characterized in terms
of the range and density of connections but also
the identiﬁcation of nodes that are particularly
central within any policy process. Analysis can
go beyond such description to understand the
dynamicsinvolvedinnetworksbyconsideringhow
resources are activated through the network links.
This provides an insight into the power relations
implied by governance processes. There is a split
here between those who see power as an attribute
ofactorswithingovernancenetworks,partlybased
on the resources they hold, and those who adopt
a relational view of power, in which power is
based on attributes of the network itself. In either
case,though,thecombinationofnetworklinksand
resourceﬂowsprovidesthebasisforunderstanding
governance processes.
New Institutionalists go beyond this to consider
how networks are turned from sets of linkages into
institutions with a long-term life (Hall and Taylor,
1996). This involves seeing how the behaviour of
actors within networks becomes embedded over
time creating path dependencies and thereby guid-
ing outcomes. This is not a deterministic approach
to understanding governance but rather one that
seeks to combine a focus on actors’behaviour and[18:14 2/7/2007 4952-Cox-Ch35.tex] Paper Size: a4 paper Job No: 4952 Cox: Handbook of Political Geography Page: 7 1–16
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decisions as well as the context within which they
act. Actors remain invested with agency and yet,
in general, tend to behave in predictable ways with
implications for outcomes and distributive impacts
on others. The role of cultural factors such as
norms, values, customs and working routines (all
discursively mediated; Rydin, 2003) are important
in embedding behaviour and creating this context.
But governance has not just been used as a
descriptive label or to deﬁne an analytic institu-
tionalist framework. It has also been extensively
usedasanormativeperspective.Governanceisnot
onlyaresponsetoidentiﬁedproblemsinthepublic
sector,butalsoademocraticidealsuggestingaway
of empowering communities and other stakehold-
ers within the policy process. And as a normative
approach,governancehasspreadbeyondaconcern
with governmental bodies and policy processes to
arenas in the economy and civil society. Corporate
governance describes new ways that are recom-
mended for ﬁrms to engage with a variety of
relevant stakeholders, from shareholders to cus-
tomerstoworkerstolocalcommunitiesnearsitesof
production. Just as governance is recommended as
abetterwaytodopolicyandcorporategovernance
is seen as a better way to do business, commu-
nity governance has been taken up as a means of
empowering local communities and ensuring that
they are both effective and operate on the basis of
inclusion.Inallthesearenas,governanceisseenas
a desired future.
Anormativeemphasisongovernancewasappar-
entwithintheprocessofdevelopingtheBrundtland
Report itself, as mentioned above. The Brundtland
Commission operated in an open and inclusive
manner, visiting many local communities as well
as national governments and taking evidence from
arangeofactorsfromscientiﬁcexpertstolocalvil-
lagers.Initsreportitemphasizedtheimportanceof
involving as wide a range of affected or interested
parties as possible in building the consensus for
a change of direction towards sustainable devel-
opment. Stakeholder involvement has, therefore,
come to be seen as emblematic of all sustainable
development politics and policy-making. Beyond
the totemic inﬂuence of the Brundtland process,
there are other reasons why governance is par-
ticularly pertinent for proponents of sustainable
development.
As a policy goal, the complexity and ambi-
guity of the concept of sustainable development
puts particular pressures on the policy process.
It requires considerable effort to specify how the
concept is to be deﬁned in speciﬁc contexts. The
Brundtland deﬁnition may inspire but it needs
further speciﬁcation. The above discussion has
highlightedthat,intheabsenceofobviousandeasy
win-win-win options, there is a need to make dif-
ﬁcult choices between environmental, economic
and social concerns and alternative packages
of outcomes. The very notion of constraining
current generations for the beneﬁt of future gen-
erations – which is at the core of sustainable
development – alsoplacesstrainsonthelegitimacy
of policy systems, particularly those accustomed
to delivering within the electoral time scale of a
democratic government. Governance can be a way
of trying to handle these pressures and strains.
Turning to implementation, sustainable devel-
opment requires multiple sets of interventions in
different domains in order to achieve the desired
mix of environmental, economic and social out-
comes. Networks bringing together actors in these
different domains can help coordinate these inter-
ventions. It can also release resources from varied
locationstosupportimplementation.Conventional
knowledgesourcesmaywellprovideweaksupport
given the emphasis on predicting future strains on
environmental systems and the inherent uncertain-
tiesinsuchpredictions.Insuchasituationthereisa
need to obtain buy-in to the scenarios of the future
underpinning policy development. There may also
be beneﬁts in bringing together information and
knowledge from a wide range of sources including
local knowledge. For all these reasons, advocates
of sustainable development have seen broad and
open stakeholder involvement as the appropriate
mode of policy work.
Beyond these policy-based rationales, there are
also strong spatial reasons why governance pro-
cesses are particularly appropriate to the pursuit of
sustainable development. To understand this, it is
necessary to unpack some of the spatial inequali-
ties associated with the social and environmental
impacts of economic development. These can be
deﬁned at ﬁve levels: site-level impacts, locality
impacts, ﬁlière impacts, transport-related impacts
and aggregate impacts (see Table 35.1).
Site-level impacts refer to the environmental
effects of the differential distribution of economic
activity (both in terms of total quantity and types
of economic activity) across space. For example,
there are the positive environmental consequences
of land reclamation for development as opposed
to the negative ones associated with deforestation
or other primary resource exploitation, or with the
abandonment of sites. Such variations in environ-
mental impacts are linked closely to the social
impacts, so that negative environmental impacts at
thisleveloftengoalongsidethelimitedordeclining
socialbeneﬁtsarisingfromeconomicdevelopment
patterns. Such ties can be very difﬁcult to break,
whether they relate to vicious cycles of declining
economic investment, increasing environmental
degradationandsocialdeprivation,orthoseassoci-
atedwitheconomicinvestmentbasedonlow-wage
labour and poor environmental conditions.
Next, there are locality impacts, which go
beyond the immediate site to consider the effects
on the locality and its hinterland, often termed[18:14 2/7/2007 4952-Cox-Ch35.tex] Paper Size: a4 paper Job No: 4952 Cox: Handbook of Political Geography Page: 8 1–16
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Table 35.1 Spatial aspects of sustainable development.
Spatial distribution of environmental impact Socio-economic dimension
Site impacts Differential distribution of economic activity and of
different types of economic activity create negative
or positive environmental impacts on site, e.g.
deforestation (cf. land reclamation)
Connection between patterns of new
development and existing spatial
equalities; urban regeneration testiﬁes
to difﬁculties of reversing vicious cycles
in the location of development;
clustering of different forms of economic
acitvity relevent here
Locality impacts Pattern of local negative environmental externalities
are associated with development, e.g. trafﬁc
generation, waste dumps
Strongly connected with distribution of
social inequalities so that lower-income
and certain ethnic groups suffer
disproportionately from such negative
externalities; tied into environmental
justice debates
Linked impacts
over distance
Filières of economic activity that connect places across
space to support production and consumption
patterns also connect differential environmental
impacts, e.g. food consumption in North and food
production in South
Raises issues of how development across
space is organized and the importance
of spatial distancing of environmental
impacts in creating econemically viable
development; connects to the spacial
distancing of different social groups also
Impacts of
transport over
distance
The transport dimension of such economic ﬁlières
generates non-local environmental impacts; at a
regional scale through migratory pollution and at a
global scale through global warming
The spatially distanced nature of economic
and social activity is a major cause of
non-local and aggregate environmental
impacts through transport
Aggregate impacts Where the patterns of consumption and production in
aggregate create environmental impacts, these are
then distributed unevenly across space; global
warming is a key example with its spatially
differentiated impacts, say in Scotland and England
The socio-economic dimension is linked not
to the physical effect but the
vlunerability, the ability to cope with
change, e.g. Florida and Bangladesh
spatial externalities. Different kinds of economic
development give rise to different patterns of local
negative and positive environmental externalities.
For example, there are the negative externali-
ties associated with development in the form of
pollution from trafﬁc generation, noxious indus-
try or waste facilities. Much environmental and
urban planning activity aims to manage the spa-
tialpatternofsuchexternalities.Theenvironmental
justice movement has shown how, despite or per-
haps even because of such planning, the pattern
of negative environmental externalities is closely
related to the spatial distribution of classes and
ethnic minorities. Empirical evidence has repeat-
edly demonstrated the strong connection between
the location of environmental ‘bads’ and the res-
idency of lower-income groups and communities
of colour, so that lower income and certain eth-
nic groups suffer disproportionately from nega-
tive environmental externalities (Agyeman et al.,
2001).
These two kinds of impact depend on the spa-
tial proximity of certain economic activity and the
associated environmental and social impact. The
nextcategoryreferstoimpactslinkedoverdistance
between different places. This draws on the notion
of ﬁlières of economic activity that connect places
across space (Amin and Thrift, 1994). Such con-
nections are necessary to support production and
consumptionpatternssothateconomicprocessesin
one location depend on parallel processes in other
locations. These ﬁlières also connect environmen-
tal impacts in different locations across space. For
example,foodconsumptionindevelopedcountries
is dependent on the production of such food in
less developed countries, whether it is mange-tout
peas from Africa or beef fed on soya from South
America. There is therefore a link between the
environmental impacts of such pea and soya pro-
duction and the sites of consumption, even though
they are spatially distanced. The notion of food
chains, linked to the broader concept of global
product chains, tries to capture these trans-spatial
links. This raises important issues of how devel-
opment across space is organized and the potential
signiﬁcance of the spatial distancing of environ-
mental impacts from consumption sites in creat-
ing economically viable development. This builds
on a long-established political economy argument
about the reliance of capitalist proﬁt-making on
the spatial distancing of different social groups
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Spatial distancing of production and consump-
tion activities (including intermediate production)
further results in the impacts of transport over dis-
tance. The environmental impacts of transport are
well known. They generate pollution at the local
level in terms of poor air quality, at the regional
scale through migratory pollutants such as sulphur
oxides and ozone, and at the global scale through
global warming. The longer the economic ﬁlières,
the greater are the environmental transport effects.
Thusthereisastrongconnectionbetweentheenvi-
ronmental and social impacts of linked economic
activities over space and the impacts of transport
over that same space. One aspect that has received
particular attention has been the distance travelled
by food consumed, conceptualized as food-miles.
One of the major components of analyses of eco-
logical footprints – which seek to draw attention to
the environmental impact of cities’ and countries’
consumption patterns – is the food-miles embod-
iedincollectiveshoppingbaskets(Chambersetal.,
2000).
Finally, in terms of spatial aspects of sustainable
development, there is the distribution of aggregate
environmental impacts. This particularly relates to
the impact of global warming arising from the
aggregationofmyriadlocaldecisionsaboutenergy
use (and, in terms of methane generation, activi-
ties such as waste disposal and animal husbandry).
The environmental impacts of global warming are
and will be distributed unevenly across space.This
is a largely physical phenomenon as sea-level rise
impacts differently in, say, the north and south
of England due to the height of land above sea
level and the ongoing tilting of the landmass of
theBritishIsles.However,thesocialandeconomic
consequences of such environmental impacts are
due to the vulnerability of societies and commu-
nities and this, in turn, relates to the level of
economic development and associated wealth, and
the capacity of political systems. Such vulnerabil-
ity refers to the ability to cope with change, both
incremental and catastrophic change. So the dif-
ferential impact of global warming on Florida and
Bangladesh relates not so much to their different
physical characteristics but rather the ability of the
public and private institutions to manage ﬂooding,
coastal erosion and more frequent periodicity of
storms.
So,returningtotheissueofhowgovernancehan-
dles these spatial aspects, it is helpful to examine
how the networks of governance handle spatiality.
Policy networks focused around sustainable devel-
opmentinvolvemultiplestakeholdersandperspec-
tivesonthesustainabledevelopmentconcept.They
also have to confront the uneven environmen-
tal and social impacts of economic development
across space. This requires governance processes
that are not simply based in one locality or terri-
tory. Rather they need institutions that can handle
suchimpactsoverspace,negotiatingbetweenterri-
toriallybasedorganizationstoachievetrade-offsor
win-win options and enabling collective action at
levelsabovesuchterritorialbodiesinthefaceofthe
threatoffree-riding.Andyetexistingorganizations
operate from speciﬁc locations, have deﬁned terri-
tories and/or are identiﬁed with particular scales.
Governance seeks to operate across these orga-
nizational limitations to link place, territory and
governmental tier. In these ways they hope to
manage the spatial dimensions of the sustainable
development concept.
The development of multi-level governance
(MLG) in sustainable development policy is a
prime example of how institutional arrangements
have developed to try and deal with such frag-
mentation. In particular, MLG has evolved to
ensure that the networks concerned with sustain-
able development in any one locality or at any
one scale have to deal with networks at higher
and lower levels. Peters and Pierre (2001) deﬁne
MLG in terms of the vertical layering of gover-
nance at different levels, so that local, regional,
national and supranational governmental or quasi-
governmental bodies are all involved in policy.
The existence of all these layers results in com-
plicated and overlapping networks for any speciﬁc
policy domain such as sustainable development.
But, in addition, Peters and Pierre point to the
potential within MLG for organizations within one
tier to bypass the immediately superior or ulterior
tier and relate directly to bodies in a different and
more distant tier. Thus, local municipalities within
Europe deal directly with the European Union on
some issues (including many urban sustainability
initiatives) rather than going through the national
governments.
The rationale for MLG is seen by Peters and
Pierre to reside in the weakening of the national
state by ﬁscal crises in the later twentieth cen-
tury, the rising challenge of emerging transna-
tional bodies such as the European Union, the
tendency towards decentralization within national
governmental systems even if only on an infor-
mal basis, and the rise of New Public Management
approaches to public administration that favour
guidance and steering over direction by govern-
mental bodies. A useful example of the different
forms that the imperative towards MLG can take
is provided by Kern and Löffelsend (2004) in their
study of the Baltic Sea region. Here they identify
three different types of MLG institution. There is
international governance by nation-states, which
can further take the form of international regimes
(such as the Helsinki Convention) or intergovern-
mental cooperation (as with the Council of Baltic
Sea States).Then there is international governance
with nation-states but also involving other kinds of
stakeholders;theexampletheygiveisBaltic21,the
Agenda 21 for the Baltic Region, which is a form[18:14 2/7/2007 4952-Cox-Ch35.tex] Paper Size: a4 paper Job No: 4952 Cox: Handbook of Political Geography Page: 10 1–16
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of international policy network. Finally, there is
transnational governance without nation-states as
in transnational networks, for example, the Union
of Baltic Cities.
These complex organizational arrangements
across tiers of government are an attempt to
deal with the trans-spatial nature of environmental
impactsandofsustainabledevelopment.However,
the emergence of such arrangements has not been
withoutitsproblems.Lundqvist(2004)haspointed
to the ‘trilemma’ of policy that MLG seeks to
tackle, that is, the mutual attainment of policy efﬁ-
ciency,participationandlegitimacy.Examiningthe
case of water management, he contrasts the efforts
toachieveecologicalefﬁciencythroughcatchment
area-based planning, while also involving a wide
range of stakeholders and achieving a legitimate
outcome backed by accountable decision-making
(traditionally the preserve of elected governmental
bodies).Heseesthesetensionsasinevitablewithin
MLG,unresolvedbytheattempttocreatemoreand
more network institutions.
To give a further example: as government
actors have extended policy processes to involve
those outside the governmental sectors in order
to achieve better policy delivery and legitimacy,
the very complexity of networks themselves can
threaten the ability to deliver and can obscure lines
of accountability. Governments have often sought
to maintain a degree of control through steering
mechanisms such as indicators or targets, often
linking achievement as measured by these means
to the release of ﬁnancial resources; this is at the
heart of New Public Management. However, a
governmental body that is looking towards better
performanceaccordingtogivenmeasurescanoften
be frustrated by the uncertainties of more open
stakeholder involvement and, as a result, may seek
to limit that involvement. In this way, tensions are
built into the governance processes of sustainable
development policy.
While MLG is one important form that gov-
ernance for sustainable development has taken,
speciﬁcally local governance has also been given
considerable emphasis within sustainable devel-
opment policy. The ﬁnal section explores local
governance to show exactly how governance can
promote sustainable development in practice.
EXAMINING HOW GOVERNANCE
CAN PROMOTE SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF
LOCAL GOVERNANCE
The rationale for local governance for sustain-
able development mixes instrumental and demo-
cratic imperatives, as is typical of all governance
arguments. On the one hand, it can be argued that
it is at the local level that there is the greatest
scope for actors to become involved in the pol-
icy process. At higher scales or tiers there are
likely to be barriers to involvement with represen-
tatives of groups, sectors or communities favoured
over the individual citizen; at the local level the
individual citizen may participate directly with-
out the need for a representative acting on his
or her behalf, (although this point can be over-
stated since representation may be inevitable even
at local levels). More practically, it is argued that
participation by larger numbers of actors is more
likely to be successful at the local level. On the
other hand, instrumental reasons for participatory
governance are that implementation of sustain-
able development policies will be facilitated. For
example, awareness-raising will be more effective
at the local level and this will in turn spur on
the behavioural changes that are needed for more
sustainable consumption and production patterns.
Furthermore, local networks embedded through
governance processes may directly generate sus-
tainable patterns, particularly where there is direct
local engagement with natural resources.
Local Agenda 21
The above rationale lies at the heart of the Local
Agenda 21 (LA21) movement. LA21 has its ori-
gins in Chapter 28 of Agenda 21 (which, as dis-
cussed above, was tabled at the 1992 Rio Summit),
setting out the importance of local communi-
ties in actually delivering sustainable development
(Lafferty, 2001). However sustainable develop-
ment is deﬁned, it can ultimately only be deliv-
ered by changes in the behaviour, decisions and
actions of households, ﬁrms, NGOs, governmen-
tal and quasi-governmental bodies at the local
level. Therefore each locality should have its own
Agenda 21. In the early days of LA21 the empha-
sis was on the process involved, with a concerted
attempt by proponents of the LA21 movement
to create a new form of local policy process.
Consensus-building, visioning and awareness-
raising were given central place, with considerable
effortgoingintoavarietyofeventstobringsustain-
abledevelopmenttothenoticeofthelocalcommu-
nity at large. Schools were often targeted as a way
ofreachinglocalhouseholds.Eventsweredesigned
to be enjoyable rather than just educational and
the energies of local environmental NGOs were
harnessedtocreateanatmosphereoflocalactivism.
Some localities took a more structured approach
with sectoral workshops being set up to exam-
ine particular topics and issues. These workshops
could focus on the key stakeholders, so that, for
example, the transport working group could bring
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trafﬁc management within the local authority,
planners, cycling organizations and consumers’
groups. But there was almost universal agree-
ment that the broader public needed to be engaged
too. The exact form that this public involvement
took depended on the role that local government
adopted.Insomelocalities–principallymunicipal-
ities in developed countries with a strong tradition
in local environmental management – the process
could tend towards consultation. At the other end
of the spectrum, though – principally in localities
where the local authority had little legitimacy or
record of efﬁcacy – local communities sometimes
took control of the LA21 process and used it as
a means of community empowerment, demanding
involvement in and even control over new areas of
localpolicy.Andalongthespectrumwereattempts
by local authorities to engage with their communi-
tiesinamoremeaningfulwaytodeliversustainable
development (LASALA, 2001).
To explain how LA21 can be effective, the
nature of network relationships within governance
requires a little more explanation and, in particu-
lar, the focus needs to turn to the situation of actors
within networks. Networks have been introduced
as sets of relationships between actors, opera-
tionalizing resources and embedded in norms and
routines. Actors ﬁnd themselves at the intersec-
tion of resource ﬂows from multiple directions.
Their behaviour and decision-making will be a
response to the impact of these resources on their
position, their interests and values in the context
of the cultural aspects captured by norms, values,
routines, and so on. The term ‘incentive struc-
ture’ describes the set of factors that shape such
behaviour and decisions from the actor’s perspec-
tive. It is important to emphasize that, tied up
in the idea of an incentive structure, are material
resources, powerandinterestsbutalsotherangeof
cultural attributes.
Suchananalysisofgovernancecanbeveryhelp-
fulinexplaininghowgovernanceworksinspeciﬁc
circumstances and, in particular, the level of par-
ticipation that is achieved. From this perspective,
participation is a result of actors weighing up the
costs and beneﬁts of participating in a particular
institutional context. The costs will include the
time, effort and monetary expenditure involved in
participation;allthesecostsarelikelytobecertain,
impacting in the present day and falling directly on
the actors that decide to participate. The beneﬁts
will include the likely outcomes of the collective
participationeffort;thesearelikelytobeuncertain,
arisinginthefutureandtobeneﬁtalarger,possibly
ill-deﬁnedgroup.Thetemptationtofree-riderather
than be actively involved in the governance effort
will be considerable. Such an explanation deﬁnes
the collective action problem that constrains
participation and hence the success of governance
processes.
This explanation also offers insights into how
to overcome the collective action problem and
enableparticipation(RydinandPennington,2000).
Successful strategies would focus on reducing per-
ceived costs and raising perceived beneﬁts; for
example, paying childcare costs, setting events at
the most convenient time for participants, making
events more enjoyable, publicizing the likely ben-
eﬁts to arise from participation, and focusing on
issues with an immediate beneﬁt to participants
(at least in the beginning). From this partial list it
canbeseenthatencouraginginvolvementingover-
nance for sustainable development faces particular
problems since many of the beneﬁts are likely to
favourfuturegenerationsandspatiallydistantcom-
munities. It takes a very strong value base among
participants to discount the costs relative to the
beneﬁts and overcome the collective action prob-
lem in such instances. Proponents of sustainable
development have argued that it is best to start
from more local concerns (such as the quality of
local green spaces for recreation and nature con-
servation) and then move outwards to more global
and trans-spatial concerns (such as global biodi-
versity). They place their faith in the possibility of
transforming the local to the global.
For example, the environmental justice move-
menthasbeencriticizedforbeingbasedinNIMBY
(Not In My Back Yard) politics, in that the
affected communities are essentially concerned to
remove locally unwanted land uses – in another
acronym, known as LULUs – such as toxic waste
sites from their locality. They have not tradition-
ally been concerned with where these LULUs
might go. However, environmental justice activ-
ities have more recently sought to use debates
about the local location of such facilities to raise
the more general question of how contempo-
rary economic production generates waste and to
argue for more sustainable modes of production
rather than just shifting the location of waste sites
(Harvey, 1996). A similar transition occurred in
nuclearplanningintheUKinthetwentiethcentury
where local communities supported by environ-
mental groups used debates about the planning
of nuclear installations to raise questions (often
against the wishes of central government) about
the need for nuclear power at all and the links to
the nuclear arms race. Such a transition from the
local to the global is not guaranteed, however, and
there remains the important ﬁrst stage of enabling
collective action within the local community
ﬁrst.
One way of encouraging collective action that
has received considerable attention has been the
generation and embedding of social capital. Social
capital as a descriptive term suggests a speciﬁc
kind of network, one with dense relationships,
characterized by recognition of the mutual inter-
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with each other. Pretty and Ward (2001) refer
to four aspects of social capital: relationships of
trust,whichenablecooperationandreducetransac-
tions costs between actors; reciprocity and regular
exchanges between actors; common rules, norms
and sanctions; and connectedness between actors
throughgroupsandnetworks.Asanormativeterm,
social capital theorists argue that creating such
dense, mutual and reciprocal networks can over-
come collective action problems. The key to this
lies in the way that norms and values can be
built into networks through repeated interactions
between actors, so as to alter the incentives facing
individual actors within the network. Establish-
ing norms of mutuality and reciprocity means that
actors who engage in collective action develop a
positive reputation while those who free-ride will
suffer the soft sanctions of loss of reputation and
be ‘shamed and blamed’. These cultural aspects of
networks can be very effective in preventing free-
riding. In addition, such institutions can develop
norms for handling conﬂict and instances of free-
riding through monitoring and enforcement by
the network itself rather than an outside agency,
thereby maintaining high levels of collective
action.
COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR SUSTAINABLE
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
In addition to its role in enabling collective action
in terms of stakeholder participation in sustainable
development politics and policy, Ostrom (1990,
1992) has argued that social capital can enable
direct community management of local resources
in a way that contributes to sustainable develop-
ment. For example, she has proposed developing
local institutions for water management based on
social capital. She has particularly emphasized
how collective action can be developed in smaller
and more homogeneous communities in a way
that enables robust and sustainable management
of resources. This argument is based on the quasi-
public-good characteristics of many environmen-
tal assets and services, whereby individual actors
exploiting the resource in their own interest collec-
tivelyresultinthedegradationoftheenvironmental
asset or service. Collective action to prevent such
collective degradation is subject to free-riding, in
that each individual actor sees it as in their inter-
ests to continue to use the environment rather than
collectively manage this exploitation; a free-rider
reasoninthat‘otherscanregulatetheirusebutIwill
beneﬁt from continuing to use it as before’. Propo-
nentsofsocialcapital,however,arguethatbuilding
up social capital prevents this collective action
problem and enables collective sustainable man-
agement of the environment, particularly through
the opportunities enhanced by social capital for
monitoring and the use of soft sanctions.
Social capital theory thus suggests that build-
ing new institutional arrangements about networks
speciﬁcallyorientedtowardsmutuality,reciprocity
and trust can be an effective way of overcoming
collective action both in terms of sustainable nat-
ural resource management for local communities
dependentonsuchresourcesandintermsofinvolv-
ing a broader range of actors more effectively in
general policy efforts for sustainable development.
The key to success here is creating new incentive
structures for actors involved in such networks.
These will be shaped by the detailed design of
the institutions, the precise extent of the networks
and the way that working routines for the network
embody certain values and norms. Recently, social
capitaltheoryhasemphasizedthedifferentkindsof
social capital that may be used in such institutional
design.
Most emphasis has traditionally been placed on
bonding social capital, which is used to create
strongtiesbetweenadelimitedsetofactors.Where
such actors form a homogeneous and relatively
small group, then experience suggests that bond-
ing capital can be most easily fostered. However,
this can be at a cost. Strong ties between members
ofthegroupmayreducethepossibilityoflinkswith
actors outside the group. This can be useful where
the management of a local resource – say, a village
watercourse or grazing ground – is at issue, but
less useful when dealing with complex goals such
as sustainable development where links between a
varietyofstakeholdersofdifferentkindsandnotall
with local stakes will be needed. There is also the
potential for strong bonding capital to have a ‘dark
side’throughcementinginstitutionalarrangements
that effectively terrorize local communities, as in
Maﬁa or terrorist organizations.
Hence, there has been the suggestion that an
alternative form of social capital, known as bridg-
ing capital, may be needed. Bridging capital is
also known as weak ties and is used to bring
unlike actors together, from different communities
or groups. Many researchers have seen bridging
capital as a useful complement to bonding capital.
For example, it may be used to tie in NGOs orga-
nized on a non-local scale with local communities.
However,bridgingcapitalisveryweaklyconceptu-
alizedandcanamounttolittlemorethananetwork
linkageoutfromagrouporcommunity.Usuallyno
limits are placed on the extent of bridging capital
and no explanation provided of how its efﬁcacy is
affected by the length or character of the linkage.
These limitations of the bridging capital concept
haveledtothesuggestionthatathirdtypeofsocial
capital is often needed, particularly in stakeholder
engagement of the type found in strategic planning
for sustainable development (Rydin and Holman,
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This third type is called bracing capital and it
describes the kind of linkages found in policy con-
texts where a limited set of varied actors need to
be bound together in collective action. Such actors
form a delimited set and therefore unlimited bridg-
ingisinappropriate.Theyareadifferentiatedgroup
so that bonding on its own will not be effective.
What is needed in a mix of strong and weak ties
withinthisdelimitedanddifferentiatedsetofactors
in order to bring about collective action, in terms
of agreement on working routines, speciﬁc policy
outputs such as strategy documents and eventu-
allycommonnormsandvaluesonpolicydirection.
Careful institutional design is needed to create this
typeofbracingcapital,butitholdsthepotentialfor
underpinningcollectiveactiontowardssustainable
development.
That said, the emphasis on building institutions
based on social capital as the favoured form of
local governance for sustainable development is
not without its limitations. There is always the
danger that practice will fall short of the ideals
of institution-building and tend instead towards
routine consultation. In such circumstances the
perceived need to build a consensus can lead to
a ‘rush to the bottom’, with the lowest common
denominator of agreement between actors being
used to generate a weak and rather meaningless
consensus. If strong local governance institutions
are generated, they may be subverted to ends other
than sustainable development and the ambiguities
in the sustainable development concept used to
disguise this. Thus, urban growth coalitions can
adopt the language of ecological modernization
to present themselves as promoting sustainable
development, when the emphasis is much more
on a continuation of past policy trends towards
urban boosterism than on any breakpoint towards
sustainable development. Then there is the con-
siderable effort, including resources, required to
create such institutions and, furthermore, to main-
tain them. More complex forms of networks based
on social capital may not actually reduce trans-
actions costs but actually increase them, reducing
policy efﬁcacy. And ﬁnally, it may not be the case
that all sustainable development problems can be
most effectively tackled through local institution-
building in this way, based on the involvement of
communities and stakeholders (Rydin and Falleth,
2005).
There is an argument to be made that in some
cases state direction, more reminiscent of gov-
ernment than governance, is a more effective
way to change currently entrenched patterns of
unsustainable consumption and production (Rydin
and Pennington, 2000). Sometimes the collective
action problem is just too considerable and the
urgency of the policy goal is just too great to
make it sensible to persist in governance efforts.
States have implicitly continued to recognize this
in their ongoing promotion of regulation as a
basis for environmental and social protection. The
beneﬁts of using this approach sometimes should
not be forgotten in the contemporary and often
overwhelming emphasis on governance.
CONCLUSION
One of the strengths but also key weaknesses in
the sustainable development concept is the way
that it seeks to combine very different goals within
one holistic package. This is bound to lead to
alternative deﬁnitions of what sustainable devel-
opment comprises when considered in detail and
consequent ambiguity and confusion within policy
processes. The open involvement of many differ-
entactorswithinstructuresofgovernanceprovides
the opportunity for each actor to press for a deﬁni-
tion that accords more closely with their interests
and values. The concern of those seeking a greater
emphasis on environmental protection or social
equity is that inclusive governance processes may
therefore result in ‘business as usual’or a dilution
of the radical potential of the concept.
Opening up sustainable development policy and
politics to governance structures does not resolve
the tensions between these different views of the
concept. Governance merely provides an opportu-
nity for different views to engage with each other
and the outcome need not be a pluralist consen-
sus or even compromise. Each governance process
carries with it certain institutional characteristics
including prevailing norms and values. These may
beconducivetoamoreradicalinterpretationofsus-
tainabledevelopmentandassociatedsocialchange,
but there are good reasons to expect that gov-
ernance institutions will be imbued with norms
that constrain such interpretations and favour an
emphasis on marginal change to existing patterns
of social and economic behaviour. The institu-
tionalist approach emphasizes the likelihood of
actors following established patterns of behaviour
under the inﬂuence of a prevailing ‘logic of appro-
priateness’ that constrains actors to behaving in
ways already considered appropriate within that
institution.Changinginstitutionallogicsandestab-
lishing new norms is like altering course with
an oil tanker, a slow process. Opening up struc-
tures to the inﬂuence of multiple stakeholders will,
in the initial stages, result in these stakeholders
engaging with each other in the context of estab-
lished norms, and this may favour policy options
such as ecological modernization rather than more
radical deep green alternatives. The result may
be future outcomes that prove to be unsustain-
able as environmental assets are substituted or
traded off in pursuit of economic and social gains.
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implementation of the Kyoto Protocol in terms
of just how much constraint on economic growth
is justiﬁed to tackle greenhouse gas emissions.
Governance offers no easy resolution of these
debates.
At root, sustainable development requires a
political, ideological and values-based shift, which
newinstitutionalarrangementsmayhelptoconsol-
idatebutcannotsubstitutefor.Withoutsuchashift,
policyinstitutionswilltendbacktomereincremen-
tal change or even relapse to a ‘business as usual’
scenario. Moving beyond this will require an iter-
ative process of value shift. Of course, if everyone
agreed that a particular form of sustainable devel-
opmentwasdesirable,thenpolicyactorswouldjust
be left with problem of implementation. The chal-
lenge is that there are contested views over what
sustainable development is, how important it is,
and how desirable any particular form is. Funda-
mentally, governance for sustainable development
has to engage with these different views and with
the underlying ideological debates.
The power of prevailing social ideologies is
considerable, as cultural theorists, social construc-
tivistsandFoucauldianshavelongtoldus.Sustain-
abledevelopmentisclearlynotanembeddedsocial
ideology, despite its emblematic use in many pol-
icy contexts. Value shift will require a discursive
challenge to prevailing ideologies or discourses.
Some of this challenge will occur in the detail
of developing institutions, speciﬁc networks and
ways of working among actors. But there is also
a broader canvas on which the battle for sustain-
able development has to be waged. This involves
the interaction, through everyday communication
between actors, of different discourses about how
social,economicandpoliticallivesshouldbeorga-
nized and how they engage with the environment.
(Rydin, 2003) Any consideration of the future for
sustainable development policy and politics will
need to take on board that the development of gov-
ernanceprocessesmustbepartofabroaderpolitics
arguing the need for change.
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